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4.1 Introduction
Is it better for you to own a corkscrew or not? If asked, you as a human being would
likely say “yes”, but more importantly, you are somehow able to make this decision.
You are able to decide this, even if your current acute problems or task do not include
opening a wine bottle. Similarly, it is also unlikely that you evaluated several possible
trajectories your life could take and looked at them with and without a corkscrew, and
then measured your survival or reproductive fitness in each. When you, as a human
cognitive agent, made this decision, you were likely relying on a behavioural “proxy”,
an internal motivation that abstracts the problem of evaluating a decision impact on
your overall life, but evaluating it in regard to some simple fitness function. One ex-
ample would be the idea of curiosity, urging you to act so that your experience new
sensations and learn about the environment. On average, this should lead to better and
richer models of the world, which give you a better chance of reaching your ultimate
goals of survival and reproduction.
But how about questions such as, would you rather be rich than poor, sick or
healthy, imprisoned or free? While each options offers some interesting new expe-
rience, there seems to be a consensus that rich, healthy and free is a preferable choice.
We think that all these examples, in addition to the question of tool ownership above,
share a common element of preparedness. Everything else being equal it is preferable
to be prepared, to keep ones options open or to be in a state where ones actions have
the greatest influence on ones direct environment.
The concept of Empowerment, in a nutshell, is an attempt at formalizing and quan-
tifying these degrees of freedom (or options) that an organism or agent has as a proxy
for “preparedness”; preparedness, in turn, is considered a proxy for prospective fitness
via the hypothesis that preparedness would be a good indicator to distinguish promis-
ing from less promising regions in the prospective fitness landscape, without actually
having to evaluate the full fitness landscape.
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Empowerment aims to reformulate the options or degrees of freedom that an agent
has as the agent’s control over its environment; and not only of its control — to be
reproducible, the agent needs to be aware of its control influence and sense it. Thus,
empowerment is a measure of both the control an agent has over its environment, as
well as its ability to sense this control. Note that this already hints at two different
perspectives to evaluate the empowerment of an agent. From the agent perspective
empowerment can be a tool for decision making, serving as a behavioural proxy for
the agent. This empowerment value can be skewed by the quality of the agent world
model, so it should be more accurately described as the agent’s approximation of its
own empowerment, based on its world model. The actual empowerment depends both
on the agent’s embodiment, and the world the agent is situated in. More precisely,
there is a specific empowerment value for the current state of the world (the agent’s
current empowerment), and there is an averaged value over all possible states of the
environment, weighted by their probability (the agent’s average empowerment).
Empowerment, as introduced by Klyubin et al. (2005a,b), aims to formalize the
combined notion of an agent controlling its environment and sensing this control in
the language of information theory. The idea behind this is that this should provide us
with a utility function that is inherently local, universal and task-independent.
1. Local means that the knowledge of the local dynamics of the agent is enough
to compute it, and that it is not necessary to know the whole system to deter-
mine one’s empowerment. Ideally, the information that the agent itself can acquire
should be enough.
2. Universal means that it should be possible to apply empowerment “universally”
to every possible agent-world interaction. This is achieved by expressing it in the
language of information theory and thus making it applicable for any system that
can be probabilistically expressed.
For instance, even if an agent completely changes its morphology, it is still pos-
sible to compute a comparable empowerment value. Klyubin et al. (2005b) gave
the examples of money in a bank account, of social status in a group of chim-
panzees, and of sugar concentration around a bacterium as different scenarios, all
as examples which would be treated uniformly by the empowerment formalism.
3. Task-independent means that empowerment is not evaluated in regard to a specific
goal or external reward state. Instead, empowerment is determined by the agent’s
embodiment in the world. In particular, apart from minor niche-dependent param-
eters, the empowerment formalism should have the very same structure in most
situations.
More concretely, the proposed formulation of empowerment defines it via the con-
cept of potential information flow, or channel capacity, between an agent’s actuator
state at earlier times and their sensor state at a later time. The idea behind this is that
empowerment would quantify how much an agent can reliably and perceptibly influ-
ence the world.
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4.1.1 Overview
Since its original inception by Klyubin et al. (2005a,b) in 2005, several papers have
been published about empowerment, both further developing the formalism, and
demonstrating a variety of behaviours in different scenarios. Our aim here is to both
present an overview of what has been done so far, and to provide readers new to em-
powerment with an easy entry point to the current state-of-the-art in the field. Due to
the amount of content, some ideas and results are only reported in abstract form, and
we would refer interested reader to the cited papers, where models and experiments
are explained in greater detail.
Throughout the text we also tried to identify the open problems and questions that
we currently see, and we put a certain emphasis on the parameters that affect empow-
erment. While empowerment is defined in a generic and general way, the review of
the literature shows that there are still several choices one can take on how to exactly
apply empowerment, and which can affect the outcome of the computation.
The remaining paper is structured as follows. First, after briefly outlining the re-
lated work previous to empowerment, we will spell out the different empowerment
hypotheses motivating the research in empowerment. This will allow us to locate em-
powerment in relation to different fields, and also makes it easier to see how and where
insights from the empowerment formalism apply to other areas.
The next section then focusses on discrete empowerment, first, in Sec. 4.4 intro-
ducing the formalism, and then, in Sec. 4.5, describing several different examples,
showcasing the genericity of the approach.
Section 4.6 then deals with empowerment in continuous settings, which is currently
not as far developed and sees vigorous activity. Here we will discuss the necessity for
suitable approximations, and outline the current technical challenges to provide good
but fast approximations for empowerment in the continuous domain.
4.2 Related Work
Empowerment is based on and connects to several fields of scientific inquiry. One
foundational idea for empowerment is to apply information theory to living, biological
systems. (Gibson James 1979) points out the importance of information in embodied
cognition, and earlier work (Barlow 1959; Attneave 1954) investigates the informa-
tional redundancy in an agent’s sensors. Later research (Atick 1992) based on this
identifies the importance of information bottlenecks for the compression of redundan-
cies, which are later formalized in information theoretic terms (Tishby et al. 1999).
Furthermore, it was also demonstrated that informational efficiency can be used to
make sense of an agent’s sensor input (Olsson et al. 2005; Lungarella et al. 2005). The
general trend observed in these works seems to be that nature optimizes the informa-
tion processing in organisms in terms of efficiency (Polani 2009). Empowerment is, in
this context, another of these efficiency principles.
Empowerment also relies heavily on the notion that cognition has to be understood
as an immediate relationship of a situated and embodied agent with its surroundings.
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This goes back to the “Umwelt” principle by (von Uexku¨ll 1909), which also provides
us with an early depiction of what is now commonly referred to as the perception ac-
tion loop. This idea was also at the center of a paradigm shift in artificial intelligence
towards enactivism (Varela et al. 1992; Almeida e Costa and Rocha 2005), which pos-
tulates that the human mind organizes itself by interacting with its environment. Em-
bodied robotics (Pfeifer et al. 2007) is an approach trying to replicate these processes
“in silico”.
4.2.1 Intrinsic Motivation
Central to this body of work is the desire to understand how an organism makes sense
of the world and decides to act from its internal perspective. Ultimately all behaviour is
connected to an organism’s survival, but most natural organisms do not have the cog-
nitive capacity to determine this connection themselves. So, if an animal gets burned
by fire, it will not consider the fire’s negative effect on its health and potential risk
of death and then move away. Instead, it will feel pain via its sensors and react ac-
cordingly. The ability to feel pain and act upon it is an adaptation that acts as a proxy
criterion for survival, while it still offers a certain level of abstraction from concrete
hard-wired reactions. We could say the animal is motivated to avoid pain. Having an
abstract motivation allows an agent a certain amount of adaptability; instead of act-
ing like a stimulus-response look-up table the agent can evaluate actions in different
situations according to how rewarding they are regarding its motivations.
Examining nature also reveals that not all motivations are based on external re-
wards, e.g. a well-fed and pain-free agent might be driven by an urge to explore or
learn. In the following we discuss related work covering different approaches to spec-
ify and quantify such intrinsic motivations. The purpose of these models is both to
better understand nature, as well as to replicate the ability of natural organism to react
to a wide range of stimuli in models for artifical systems.
An evolution-based view of intrinsic motivations uses assumptions about preexist-
ing saliency sensors to generate intrinsic motivations (Singh et al. 2005, 2010). How-
ever, where one does not want to assume such pre-evolved saliency sensors, one needs
to identify other criteria that can operate with unspecialized generic sensors.
One such family of intrinsic motivation mechanisms focusses on evaluating the
learning process. Artificial curiosity (Schmidhuber 2002, 1991) is one of the earlier
models, where an agent receives an internal reward depending on how “boring” the
environment is which it currently tries to learn. This causes the agent to avoid situations
that are at either of the extremes: fully predictable or unpredictably random.
The autotelic principle by Steels (2004) tries to formalize the concept of “Flow”
(Csikszentmihalyi 2000): an agent tries to maintain a state were learning is challeng-
ing, but not overwhelming (see also Gordon and Ahissar 2012). Another approach
(Kaplan and Oudeyer 2004) aims to maximise the learning progress of different classi-
cal learning approaches by introducing rewards for better predictions of future states.
A related idea is behind the homeokinesis approach, which can be considered a dy-
namic version of homoeostasis. The basic principle here is to act in a way which can
be well predicted by a adaptive model of the world dynamics (Der et al. 1999). There
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is a tendency of such mechanisms to place the agent in stable, easily predictable en-
vironments. For this reason, to retain a significant richness of behaviours additional
provisions need to be taken so that notwithstanding the predictability of the future, the
current states carry potential for instability.
The ideas of homeokinesis are originally based on dynamical system theory. Fur-
ther studies have transferred them into the realm of information-theoretical approaches
(Ay et al. 2008). The basic idea here is to maximise the predictive information, the in-
formation the past states of the world have about the future. Here, also, predictability
is desired, but predictive information will only be large if the predictions about the fu-
ture are decoded from a rich past, which captures very similar ideas to the dynamical
systems view of homeokinesis.
The empowerment measure which is the main concept under discussion in the
present paper, also provides a universal, task-independent motivation dynamics. How-
ever, it focusses on a different niche. It is not designed to explore the environment,
as most of the above measures are, but rather aims at identify preferred states in the
environment, once the local dynamics are known; if not much is known about the envi-
ronment, but empowerment is high, this is perfectly satisfactory for the empowerment
model, but not for the earlier curiosity-based methods. Therefore, empowerment is
better described as a complement to the aforementioned methods, rather than a direct
competitor.
Empowerment has been motivated by a set of biological hypotheses, all related
to informational sensorimotor efficiency, the ability to react to the environment and
similar. However, it would be interesting to identify whether there may be a route
stemming from the underlying physical principles which would ultimately lead to such
a principle (or a precursor thereof). For some time, the ”Maximum Entropy Production
Principle” (MEPP) has been postulated as arising from first thermodynamic principles
(Dewar 2003, 2005). However, unfortunately, and according to current knowledge, the
derivation from first principles still remains elusive and the current attempts at doing so
unsuccessful (Grinstein and Linsker 2007). If, however, one should be able to derive
the MEPP from first principles, then (Wissner-Gross and Freer 2013) show that this
would allow a principle to emerge on the physical (sub-biological) level which acts as a
simpler proto-empowerment which shares to some extent several of the self-organizing
properties with empowerment, even if in a less specific way and without reference to
the “bubble of autonomy” which would accompany a cognitive agent. Nevertheless,
if successful, such a line may provide a route to how a full-fledged empowerment
principle could emerge from physical principles.
4.3 Empowerment Hypotheses
In this section we want to introduce the main hypotheses which motivated the develop-
ment of empowerment. Neither the work presented here in this chapter, nor the work
on empowerment in general is yet a conclusive argument for either of the three main
hypotheses, but they should, nevertheless, be helpful to outline what empowerment can
be used for, and to what different domains empowerment can be applied. Furthermore,
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it should also be noted, that the hypotheses are stated in a generic form which might be
unsuitable for experimental testing, but this can be alleviated on a case by case basis
by applying a hypothesis to a specific scenario or task.
There are two main motivations for introducing the concept of empowerment: one
is, of course, the desire to come up with methods to allow artificial agents to flexibly
decide what to do generically, without having a specific task designed into them in
every situation. This is closely related to the idea of creating a general AI. The other
is to search for candidate proxies of prospective fitness, which could be detected and
driven towards during the lifetime of an organism to improve its future reproductive
success.
From these two starting points, several implicit and explicit claims have been made
about empowerment and how it would relate to phenomena in biology. In the following
section we structure these claims into three main hypotheses which we would consider
as driving the “empowerment program”. This should make it easier for the reader to
understand what the simulations in the later chapters should actually demonstrate.
4.3.1 Behavioural Empowerment Hypothesis
The adaptation brought about by natural evolution produced organisms that
in absence of specific goals behave as if they were maximising their empow-
erment.
Klyubin et al. (2005a,b) argue that the direct feedback provided by selection in evo-
lution is relatively sparse, and therefore it would be infeasible to assume that evolution
adapts the behaviour of organisms specifically for every possible situation. Instead they
suggest that organisms might be equipped with local, task-independent utility detec-
tors, which allows them to react well to different situations. Such generic adaptation
might have arisen as a solution to a specific problem, and then persisted as a solu-
tion to other problems, as well. This also illustrates why such a utility function should
be universal: namely, because it should be possible to retain the essential structure of
the utility model, even if the morphology, sensor or actuators of the organism change
through evolution.
This is also based on our understanding of humans and other organisms. We seem
to be, at least in part, adapted to learn, explore and reason, rather than to only have
hard-coded reactions to specific stimuli. As these abilities also usually generate ac-
tions, such a drive is sometimes called intrinsic motivation. Different approaches have
been proposed (see Sec. 4.2) to formalize motivation that would generate actions that
are not caused by an explicit external reward. Empowerment does not consider the
learning process or the agent trajectory through the world, but instead operates as a
pseudo-utility which assigns a value (its empowerment) to each state in the world1.
Highly empowered states are preferred, and the core hypothesis states that an agent or
organism attempts to reach states with high empowerment. Empowerment measures
1Here we mostly adopt an “objective” perspective in that the objective states of the world are
known and their empowerment computed. However, truly subjective versions of empowerment
are easily definable and will be discussed in Sec. 4.4.4 as context-dependent empowerment.
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the ability of the agent to potentially change its future (it does not mean that it is ac-
tually doing that). The lowest value for empowerment is 0, which means that an agent
has no influence on the world that it can perceive. From the empowerment perspec-
tive, vanishing empowerment is equivalent to the agent’s death, and the empowerment
maximization hypothesis provides a natural drive for death aversion.
The behaviour empowerment hypothesis now assumes that evolution has come up
with a solution that produces similar behaviour. To support this hypothesis, the first
step would be to demonstrate that empowerment can produce behaviour which is sim-
ilar to biological organisms in analogous situations. In turn, it should also be possi-
ble to anticipate behaviour of biological organisms by considering how it would af-
fect their empowerment. If we follow this idea further and assume that humans use
empowerment-like criteria to inform their introspection, then one would expect that
those states identified by humans as preferable would also be more likely to have high
empowerment.
For the hypothesis to be plausible, it would also be good to ensure that empower-
ment is indeed local and can be computed from the information available to the agent.
Similarly, it should also be universally applicable to different kinds of organisms; we
would expect organisms which have undergone small changes to their sensory-motor
set-up to still produce comparable empowerment values, and for organisms that dis-
cover new modalities of interaction that this is then reflected in the empowerment
landscape.
So far, we have discussed a weak version of the behavioural empowerment hy-
pothesis. A stronger version of the hypothesis2 would argue that an agent actually
computes empowerment. While this can be easily checked for artificial agents, in a
biological scenario, it becomes necessary to explain how empowerment could actually
be computed by the agent. The weak version of the hypothesis, instead, says that the
agents just act “as if” driven by empowerment, or are using a suitable approximation.
The hypothesis then states that natural behaviours favour highly empowered behaviour
routes.
4.3.2 Evolutionary Empowerment Hypothesis
The adaptation brought about by natural evolution increases the empower-
ment of the resulting organism.
Due to its universality, empowerment can in principle, be used to compare the av-
erage empowerment of different organisms. For instance, today, we could look at a
digital organism, and then come back later after several generations of simulated adap-
tation, asking whether the organisms are now more empowered? Did that new sensor
(and/or actuator) increase the agents empowerment? The hypothesis put forward, e.g.
by Polani (2009), is that the adaptation in nature, on average, increases an agent’s em-
powerment. He argues that (Shannon) information operates as a “currency of life”,
which imposes an inherent cost onto an organism, and, for that reason, a well-adapted
2We do not actually put forward this stronger version for the biological realm, but mention
it for completeness, and because of its relevance for empowerment in artificial agents.
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organism should have efficient information processing. On the one hand, there is some
relevant information (Polani et al. 2006) that needs to be acquired by an agent to per-
form at a given level, but any additional information processing would be superfluous,
and should be avoided, as it creates unnecessary costs. Taking a look at agent mor-
phologies, this also means that agents should be adapted to efficiently use their sensors
and actuators. For example, a fish population living in perpetual darkness does not
have a need for highly developed eyes (Jeffery 2005), and it is expected that adapta-
tion will reduce the functionality and cognitive investment (i.e. brain operation) related
to vision. On the other hand, in the dark the detection of sound could be useful; this
perceptual channel could be made even more effective by actively generating sound
that is then reflected from objects and could then be detected by the organism. The
core question is: how can such potential advantageous gradients in the space of senso-
rimotoric endowment be detected?
Empowerment is the channel capacity from an agent’s actuators to its sensors, and
as such, measures the efficiency of that channel. Having actuators whose effect on the
environment cannot be perceived, or sensors which detect no change relevant to the
current actions is inefficient, and should be selected against. In short, this adaptation
would be attained by an increase of the agent’s average empowerment.
A test for this hypothesis would be to evolve agents in regard to other objectives,
and then check how their empowerment develops over the course of the simulated
evolution, similar to studies about complexity growth under evolutionary pressures
(Yaeger 2009). Another salient effect of this hypothesis would be an adaptation of an
agent morphology based on empowerment should produce sensor layouts and actions
which are to some degree “sensible” and perhaps could also be compared to those
found in nature.
4.3.3 AI Empowerment Hypothesis
Empowerment provides a task-independent motivation that generate AI be-
haviour which is beneficial for a range of goal-oriented behaviour.
In existing work, it was demonstrated that empowerment can address quite a selection
of AI problems successfully (see the remaining chapter for a selection); amongst these
are pole balancing, maze centrality and others. However, a clear contraindication ex-
ists for its use: if an externally desired goal state is not highly empowered, then an
empowerment-maximising algorithm is not going to seek it out. Opposed to that, such
tasks are the standard domain of operation for traditional AI algorithms.
However, in the realm or robotics there have been developments to design robots
that are not driven by specific goals, but motivated by exploring their own morphology
or other forms of intrinsic motivation. The idea is to build robots that learn and ex-
plore, rather than engineer solutions for specific problems determined externally and
in advance. Here, empowerment offers itself as another alternative. While empower-
ment is not designed to explicitly favour exploration, it has an inbuilt incentive to avoid
behaviour that leads to a robot being stuck. Having no options available to an agent is
bad for empowerment. Non-robotic AI could also benefit from this approach, but since
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empowerment is defined over the agent world dynamics, there needs to be a clear in-
terface between an agent and the world over which it can be computed: in this case,
there needs to be some kind of substitute for embodiment or situatedness. On the other
hand, for the robotics domain it is also important that empowerment can be computed
in real time and be applied to continuous variables.
The concrete and relevant question would be under which circumstances empow-
erment would provide a good solution, both in robotic and non-robotic settings? Fur-
thermore, in what situations would maximising empowerment be helpful for a later to
be specified task? To approach this question it is helpful to apply empowerment to a
wider range of AI problems and inspect its operation in the different scenarios. The re-
maining chapter will showcase several such examples and discuss the insights gained
from these.
In the robotic domain, one faces additional challenges, most prominently the ne-
cessity to handle empowerment in continuous spaces. This is discussed in Sec. 4.6.
Note, however, that there is still very little current experience on deploying empower-
ment on real robots, with exception of a basic proof-of-principle context reconstruction
example on an AIBO robot (Klyubin et al. 2008).
4.4 Formalism
Empowerment is formalized using terms from information theory, first introduced by
Shannon (Shannon 1948). To define a consistent notation, we begin by introducing
several standard notions. Entropy is defined as
H(X) = −
∑
x∈X
p(x) log p(x) (4.1)
where X is a discrete random variable with values x ∈ X, and p(x) is the probability
mass function such that p(x) = Pr{X = x}. Throughout this paper base 2 logarithms
are used by convention, and therefore the resulting units are in bits. Entropy can be
understood as a quantification of uncertainty about the outcome of X before it is ob-
served, or as the average surprise at the observation of X . Introducing another random
variable Y jointly distributed with X , enables the definition of conditional entropy as
H(X|Y ) = −
∑
x∈X
p(y)
∑
y∈Y
p(x|y) log p(x|y). (4.2)
This measures the remaining uncertainty about X when Y is known. Since Eq. (4.1)
is the general uncertainty of X , and Eq. (4.2), is the remaining uncertainty once Y
has been observed, their difference, called mutual information, quantifies the average
information one can gain about X by observing Y . Mutual information is defined as
I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X). (4.3)
The mutual information is symmetric (see (Cover and Thomas 1991)), and it holds that
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I(X;Y ) = H(Y )−H(Y |X) = H(X)−H(X|Y ). (4.4)
Finally, a quantity which is used in communication over a noisy channel to determine
the maximum information rate that can be reliably transmitted, is given by the channel
capacity:
C = max
p(x)
I(X;Y ) . (4.5)
These concepts are fundamental measures in classical information theory.
Now, for the purpose of formalizing empowerment, we will now reinterpret the
latter quantity in a causal context, and specialize the channel we are considering to the
actuation-perception channel.
4.4.1 The Causal Interpretation of Empowerment
Core to the empowerment formalism is now the potential causal influence of one vari-
able (or set of variables: the actuators) on another variable (or set of variables: the
sensors). Further below, we will define the framework to define this in full general-
ity; for now, we just state that we need to quantify the potential causal effect that one
variable has on the other.
When we speak about causal effect, we specifically consider the interventionist
notion of causality in the sense of Pearl (2000) and the notion of causal information
flow based upon it (Ay and Polani 2008). We sketch this principle very briefly and refer
the reader to the original literature for details.
To determine the causal information flow Φ(X → Y ) one cannot simply consider
the observed distribution p(x, y), but has to probe the distribution by actively inter-
vening in X . The change resulting from the intervention in X (which we denote by
Xˆ) is then observed in the system and used to construct the interventional conditional
p(y|xˆ). This interventional condition will then be used as the causal channel of interest.
While (causal) information flow according to (Ay and Polani 2008) has been defined
as the mutual information over that channel for an independent interventional input
distribution, empowerment considers the maximal potential information flow, i.e. it is
not based on the actual distribution of the input variable X (with or without interven-
tion), but considers the maximal information flow that could possibly be induced by a
suitable choice of X . This, however, is nothing other than the channel capacity
C(X → Y ) = max
p(xˆ)
I(Xˆ;Y ). (4.6)
for the channel defined by p(y|xˆ), where by the hat we indicate that this is a channel
where we intervene in X .
There is a well-developed literature on how to determine the conditional probabil-
ity distribution p(y|xˆ) necessary to compute empowerment, for some approaches, see
(Pearl 2000; Ay and Polani 2008). This interventional conditional probability distribu-
tion can then be treated as the channel; and the channel capacity, or empowerment, can
be computed with established methods, such as the Blahut-Arimoto algorithm (Blahut
1972; Arimoto 1972).
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For the present discussion, it shall suffice to say that empowerment can be com-
puted from the conditional probability distribution of observed actuation/sensing data,
as long as we can ensure that the channel is a causal pair, meaning we can rule out any
common cause, and any reverse influence from y onto x.
4.4.2 Empowerment in the Perception Action Loop
The basic idea behind empowerment is to measure the influence of an agent on its en-
vironment, and how much of this influence can be perceived by the agent. In analogy to
control theory, it is essentially a combined measure of controllability (influence on the
world) and observability (perception by the agent), but, unlike in the control-theoretic
context, where controllability and observability denote the dimensionality of the re-
spective vector spaces or manifolds, empowerment is a fully information-theoretic
quantity: This has two consequences: the values it can assume are not confined to
integer dimensionalities, but can range over the continuum of non-negative real num-
bers; and, secondly, it is not limited to linear subspaces or even manifolds, but can, in
principle, be used in all spaces for which one can define a probability mass measure.
We formalize the concept of empowerment, as stated earlier, as the channel capac-
ity between an agent’s actions at a number of times and its sensoric stimuli at a later
time. To understand this in detail, let us first take a step back and see how to model an
agent’s interaction with the environment as a causal Bayesian network (CBN). In gen-
eral we are looking at a time-discrete model where an agent interacts with the world.
This can be expressed as a perception-action loop, where an agent chooses an action
for the next time step based on its sensor input in the current time step. This influences
the state of the world (in the next time step), which in turn influences the sensor input
of the agent at that time step. The cycle then repeats itself, with the agent choosing an-
other action. Note that this choice of action might also be influenced by some internal
state of the agent which carries information about the agent’s past. To model this, we
define the following four random variables:
A: the agent’s actuator3 which takes values a ∈ A
S: the agent’s sensor which takes values s ∈ S
M : the agent’s internal state (or memory) which takes values m ∈M
R: the state of the environment which takes values r ∈ R
Their relationship can be expressed as a time-unrolled CBN, as seen in Fig. 1(a).
Empowerment is then defined as the channel capacity between the agent’s actuators
A and its own sensors S at a later point in time, here, for simplicity, we assume the
next time step:
E := C(At → St+1) ≡ max
p(at)
I(St+1;At) . (4.7)
This is the general empowerment of the agent. In the following text we will use E as a
shorthand for the causal channel capacity from the sensors to the actuators.
3Saying actuator implicitly includes the case of multiple actuators. In fact, it is the most
general case. Multiple actuators (which can be independent of each other) can always be written
as being incorporated into one single actuator variable.
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Rt−1
St−1 At−1
Rt
St At
Rt+1
(a) Memoryless Perception Action Loop
Rt−1
St−1
Mt−1
At−1
Rt
St
Mt
At
Rt+1
(b) Perception Action Loop with Memory
Fig. 4.1. Causal Bayesian network of the perception-action loop, unrolled in time, showing (a) a
memoryless model, (b) a model including agent memory. In the memoryless model the agent’s
actions At only depend on its current sensor inputs St, while the perception action loop with
memory allows for agent models in which the agent can store information from sensor inputs in
the past in M , and use this information later for its decision making in A.
Note that the maximization implies that it is calculated under the assumption that
the controller which chooses the action A is free to act, and is not bound by possi-
ble behaviour strategy p(a|s,m). Importantly, the distribution p∗(a) that achieves the
channel capacity is different from the one that defines the actions of an empowerment-
driven agent. Empowerment considers only the potential information flow, so the agent
will only calculate how it could affect the world, rather than actually carry out its po-
tential.
4.4.3 n-step empowerment
In Sec. 4.4.2, we considered empowerment as a consequence of a single action taken
and the sensor being read out in the subsequent state. However, empowerment, as
a measure of the sensorimotor efficiency, may start distinguishing the characteristics
of the agent-environment interaction only after several steps. Therefore, a common
generalization of the concept is the n-step empowerment. In this case we consider
not a single action variable, but actually a sequence of action variables for the next
n time steps: (At+1, . . . , At+n). We we will sometimes condense these into a single
action variableA for notational convenience. The sensor variable is the resulting sensor
state in the following timestep St+n+1, again sometimes denoted by S. Though it
is not the most general treatment possible, here we will consider only “open-loop”
action sequences, i.e. action sequences which are selected in advance and then carried
out without referring to a sensor observation until the final observation St+n+1. This
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drastically simplifies both computations and theoretical considerations, as the different
possible action sequencesA can be treated as if they were separate atomic actions with
no inner structure4.
As mentioned A can typically contain actuator variables from several time steps
and can also incorporate several variables per time step. S is typically chosen to contain
variables that are strictly temporally downstream from all variables in A, to ensure a
clean causal interpretation of the effect of A on S. However, the less studied concept
of interleaved empowerment has been mentioned in (Klyubin et al. 2008), where S
contains sensor variables that lie before some variables in A5.
4.4.4 Context-dependent Empowerment
Until now, we have considered empowerment as a generic characterization of the in-
formation efficiency of the perception-action loop. Now we go a step further and re-
solve this informational efficiency in more detail; specifically, we are going to consider
empowerment when the system (e.g. agent and environment) is in different states. As-
suming that the state of the system is given by r, it will in general affect the effect of
the actions on the later sensor states, so that one now considers p(s|a, r) and defines
empowerment for the world being in state r as
E(r) = max
p(a)
I(S;A|r), (4.8)
which is referred to as state-dependent empowerment. This also allows us to define the
average state-dependent empowerment for an agent that knows what state the world is
in as
E(R) =
∑
r∈R
p(r)E(r) (4.9)
Note that this is different from the general empowerment: the general empowerment in
Sec. 4.4.2 does not distinguish between different states. If different perception-action
loop characteristics p(s|a) are not resolved, the general empowerment can be vanish-
ing, while average state-dependent empowerment is non-zero. In other words, empow-
erment can depend on being able to resolve states which affect the actuation-sensing
channel.
In general, an agent will not be able to resolve all states in the environment, and will
operate using a limited sensoric resolution of the world state. When we assume this,
the agent might still be able to recognize that the world is in a certain context k ∈ K,
based on memory and sensor input. So, an agent might not know its precise state in the
world, but may be able to identify some coarse position, e.g. that it might be north or
4Future work will investigate the effect of feedback, i.e. closed-loop sequences. However,
the current hypothesis is that there will be little qualitative and quantitative difference for most
scenarios, with significantly increased computational complexity.
5The interpretation of interleaved empowerment is slightly subtle and still subject to study,
as in this case S is then capturing rather an aspect of the richness of the action sequences and
the corresponding action history, in addition to the state dynamics of the system.
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south of some distinct location. Klyubin et al. (2008) demonstrate an example of how
such a context can be created from data. Based on this context, it is then possible to
define the marginal conditional distribution p(s|a, k), which then allows us to compute
the (averaged) contextual empowerment for K as
E(K) =
∑
k∈K
p(k)E(k) (4.10)
In comparison, context free empowerment Efree has no assumption about the world
and is based on the marginal distribution p(s|a) =∑r p(s|a, r)p(r) of all world states.
This is the empowerment that an agent would calculate which has no information about
the current world state. It can be shown (Capdepuy 2010) with Jensen’s Inequality that
Efree ≤ E(K) ≤ E(R) (4.11)
This implies (see also Klyubin et al. 2008) that there is a (not necessarily unique)
minimal optimal context Kopt that best characterizes the world in relation to how the
agent’s actions affect the world, defined by:
Kopt = arg min
K
E(K)=E(R)
H(K). (4.12)
Such a context Kopt is one which leads to the maximal increase in contextual em-
powerment. Klyubin et al. (2008) argues that such an agent internal measure could be
useful to develop internal contexts which are purely intrinsic and based on the agent
sensory-motor capacity, and thereby allow developing an understanding of the world
based on the way they are able to interact with it.
4.4.5 Open vs. Closed-Loop Empowerment
An important distinction to make is the one between open- and closed-loop empower-
ment. Open-loop empowerment treats the perception-action loop like a unidirectional
communication channel, and assumes that all inputs are chosen ahead of time and
without getting any feedback about their source. Closed-loop empowerment is com-
puted under the assumption that some of the later actions in n-step empowerment can
change in reaction to the current sensor state.
In most of the existing work, empowerment calculations have been performed with
open-loop empowerment only. The framework for this simplest of cases of commu-
nication theory is well developed and long known. For the more intricate cases using
feedback, Capdepuy (2010) pointed out that directed information (Massey 1990) could
be used to simplify the computation of closed loop empowerment, and demonstrated
for an example how feedback increases empowerment.
4.4.6 Discrete Deterministic Empowerment
A deterministic world is one where each action leads to one specific outcome, i.e. for
every a ∈ A there is exactly one sa ∈ S with the property that
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p(s|a) =
{
1 if s = sa
0 else .
(4.13)
Since here every action only has one outcome, it is clear that the conditional uncer-
tainty of S given A is zero, i.e., H(S|A) = 0. From Eq. (4.4) it follows then that
E = max
p(a)
(A;S) = max
p(a)
H(S). (4.14)
Since the entropy is maximal for a uniform distribution, S can be maximised by choos-
ing any input distribution p(a) which results in a uniform distribution over the set of
all reachable states of S, i.e over the set SA = {s ∈ S|∃a ∈ A : p(s|a) ≥ 0}. As a
result, empowerment for the discrete deterministic case reduces to
E = −
∑
s∈SA
1
|SA| log (
1
|SA| ) = log(|SA|). (4.15)
The bottom line is that in a discrete deterministic world empowerment reduces to the
logarithm of the number of sensor states reachable with the available actions. This
means empowerment, in the deterministic case, is fully determined by how many dis-
tinguishable states the agent can reach.
4.4.7 Non-deterministic Empowerment Calculation
If noise is present in the system, an action sequence a will lead to multiple outcomes
s, and thus, we have to consider an actual output distribution p(s|a). In this case,
the optimizing distribution needs to be determined using the standard Blahut-Arimoto
(BA) algorithm (Blahut 1972; Arimoto 1972) which is an expectation maximization-
type algorithm for computing the channel capacity.
BA iterates over distributions pk(a), where k is the iteration counter, converging
towards the distribution that maximises channel capacity, and thereby towards the em-
powerment value defined in Eq. (4.8). Since the action variable A is discrete and finite
we are dealing with a finite number of actions av ∈ A, with v = 1, ..., n. There-
fore pk(a) in the k-th iteration can be compactly represented by a vector pk(a) ≡
(p1k, ..., p
n
k ), with p
v
k ≡ Pr(A = av), the probability that the action A attains the value
av . Furthermore, let s ∈ S be the possible future states of the sensor input as a result of
selecting the various actions with respect to which empowerment is being calculated,
and r ∈ R is the current state of the environment. If we assume that S is continuous
we can follow the general outline from (Jung et al. 2011), and define, for notational
convenience, the variable dv,k as:
dv,k :=
∫
S
p(s|r,av) log
[
p(s|r,av)∑n
i=1 p(s|r,ai)pik
]
ds. (4.16)
While this is the more general case, this integral is difficult to evaluate for arbitrary
distributions of S. We will later discuss, in Sec. 4.6.6, how this integral can be ap-
proximated, but even the approximations are very computationally expensive. If we
are dealing with discrete and finite S we can simply define dv,k with a sum as
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dv,k :=
∑
s∈S
p(s|r,av) log
[
p(s|r,av)∑n
i=1 p(s|r,ai)pik
]
. (4.17)
The definition of dv,k encapsulates the differences between a continuous and discrete
S. Therefore, the following parts of the BA algorithm are identical for both cases. The
BA begins with initialising p0(a) to be (e.g.) uniformly distributed6, by simply setting
pv0 =
1
n for all actions v = 1, ..., n. At each iteration k ≥ 1, the new approximation
for the probability distribution pk(a) is obtained from the old one pk−1(a) using
pvk :=
1
z k
pvk−1 exp(dv,k−1) (4.18)
where zk is a normalisation parameter ensuring that the approximation for the proba-
bility distribution pk(a) sum to one for all actions v = 1, ..., n, and is defined as
zk :=
n∑
v=1
pvk−1 exp(dv,k−1). (4.19)
Thus pk(a) is calculated for iteration step k, it can then be used to obtain an estimate
Ek(r) for the empowerment E(r) using
Ek(r) =
n∑
v=1
pvk · dv,k. (4.20)
The algorithm can be iterated over a fixed number of times or until the absolute differ-
ence |Ek(r)− Ek−1(r)| drops below an arbitrary chosen threshold .
4.5 Discrete Examples
4.5.1 Maze
Historically, the first scenario used to illustrate the properties of empowerment was
a maze setting introduced in (Klyubin et al. 2005a). Here, the agent is located in a
two-dimensional grid world. The agent has five different actions; it can move to the
adjacent squares north, east, south and west of it, or do nothing. An outer boundary
and internal walls block the agents movement. If an agent chooses the action to move
against a wall, it will not move.
The states of the agent’s action variable A for n-step empowerment are constituted
by all 5n action sequences that contain n consecutive actions. The resulting sensor
value S consists of the location of the agent at time step tn+1, after the last action was
executed. Since we are dealing with a discrete and deterministic world, empowerment
can be calculated as in Eq. (4.15) in Sec. 4.4.6 by taking the logarithm of all states
reachable in n steps.
6In principle, any distribution can be selected, provided none of the initial probabilities is 0,
as the BA-algorithm cannot turn a vanishing probability into a finite one.
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Fig. 4.2. The graph depicts the empowerment values for 5 step action sequences for the differ-
ent positions in a 10 × 10 maze. Walls are shown in white, and cells are shaded according to
empowerment. As the key suggests empowerment values are in the range [3.46, 5.52] bits. This
figure demonstrates that by simply assessing its options (in terms of movement possibilities)
reflected in its empowerment, the agent can discover various features of the world. The most
empowered cells in the labyrinth are those that can reliable reach the most positions within the
next 5 steps. The graph is a reproduction of the results in (Klyubin et al. 2005a)
4.5.2 Average Distance vs. Empowerment
In this maze example, empowerment is directly related to how many states an agent
can reach within the next n steps. Now, note that, via the agent’s actions, a Finsler
metric-like (Wilkens 1995; Lo´pez and Martı´nez 2000) structure is implied on the maze,
namely the minimum number of action steps necessary to move from one given posi-
tion in the maze to a target position. Calculating n-step empowerment for the current
location in the maze then is simply the logarithm of all states with a distance of n or
less to the current state.
Although this n-step horizon provides empowerment with an essentially local
“cone of view”, Klyubin et al. (2005a) showed in the maze example that empower-
ment of a location is negatively correlated with the average distance of that location to
all other locations in the maze. The first is a local, the latter, however, a global prop-
erty. This indicates that the local property of n-step reachability (essentially n-step
empowerment) would relate to a global property, namely that of average distance.
It is a current study objective to which extent this local/global relation might be
true, and under which conditions. Wherever it applies, the empowerment of an agent
(which can be determined from knowledge of the local dynamics, i.e. how are my next
n-steps going to affect the world) could then be used as a proxy for certain global prop-
erties of the world, such as the average distance to all other states. It is clear that this
cannot, in general, be true, as outside of the empowerment horizon n, an environment
could change its characteristics drastically, unseen to the “cone of view” of the agent’s
local empowerment. However, many relevant scenarios have some regularity pervad-
ing the whole system which has the opportunity to be detected by empowerment.
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This motif was further investigated by Anthony et al. (2008), who studied in more
detail the relationship between graph centrality and empowerment. The first chosen
model was a two-dimensional grid world that contained a pushable box, similar to
(Klyubin et al. 2005a). The agent could take five actions; move north, south, west,
east, or do nothing. If the agent moves into the location with the box, the box would be
pushed into the next square. The state space, the set of possible world configurations,
included the position of the agent, and also the position of the box.
The complete system can be modelled as a directed labelled graph, where each
node represents a different state of the world and the directed edges, labelled with
actions, represent the transitions from one state to another under a specific action. For
an agent with 5 possible actions, all nodes have 5 edges leading away from them. This
is a generic representation of any discrete and deterministic model. The advantage of
this representation is that it provides a core characterization of the system in graph-
theoretic language which is abstracted away from a physical representation. As before,
the distance from one state to another depends on how many actions an agent needs
to move from the first to the second state. In general, this defines a Finsler metric-like
structure (see Sec. 4.5.2), and is not necessarily tied to physical distance.
Anthony et al. (2008) then studied the correlation between closeness centrality and
empowerment, both for the previously described box pushing scenario. In addition,
he considered a different scenario, namely scale-free random networks as transition
graphs. As before, one can consider closeness centrality (which is a global property),
and empowerment (which can be calculated from a local subset of the graph). Anthony
et al. (2008) find that:
“these results show a strong indication of certain global aspects of various
worlds being ‘coded’ at a local level, and an appropriate sensory configuration
can not only detect this information, but can also use it. . . ”
It is, however, currently unknown how generally and under which circumstances this
observation holds. As mentioned before, it is possible to construct counterexamples.
A natural example is the one that Anthony et al. note in their discussion, namely that
the relationship breaks down for the box pushing example when the agents horizon
does not extend to the box; in this case, the agent is too far away for n-step empower-
ment to be affected by the box. This might indicate that a certain degree of structural
homogeneity throughout the world is necessary for this relation to hold, and that the
existence of different “pockets” in the state space with different local rules would limit
the ability of empowerment to estimate global properties. After all, if there is a part
of the world that is radically different from the one the agent is in, and the agent is
not able to observe it in the near future, the current situation may not be able to be
informative concerning that remote part of the world.
At present, however, it remains an open question how empowerment relates to
global properties, such as in the example of graph centrality or average distance. No
full or even partial characterization of scenarios where empowerment correlates to
global values is currently known.
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4.5.3 Sensor and Actuator Selection
An agent’s empowerment is not only affected by the state of the world, i.e., the context
of the agent, but also depends on what the agent’s sensors and actions are. This was
illustrated by Klyubin et al. (2005a) by variation of the previously mentioned box-
pushing example. In all scenarios we are dealing with a two dimensional grid world
where the agent has five different actions. The center of the world contains a box. In
Fig. 4.3 we see the 5-step empowerment values for the agent’s starting position in four
different scenarios. The scenarios differ depending on
1. whether the agent can perceive the box and
2. whether the agent can push the box.
stationary box pushable box
the agent
does not
perceive
the box
a. E ∈ [5.86; 5.93] b. E = log2 61
≈ 5.93 bit
the agent
perceives
the box
c. E ∈ [5.86; 5.93] d. E ∈ [5.93; 7.79]
Fig. 4.3. Empowerment maps for 5-step empowerment in a 2 dimensional grid world, containing
a box in the center. The scenarios differ by whether the box can be pushed by the agent or not,
and whether the agent can perceive the box. Black indicates the highest empowerment. Figure
reproduced from (Klyubin et al. 2005a)
In Fig 4.3.b the agent can push the box but cannot sense it. The box neither influ-
ences the agent’s outcome, nor is the agent able to perceive it. Basically, this is just
like a scenario without a box. Consequently, the empowerment map of the world is
flat, i.e., all states have the same empowerment. For empowerment applications this is
typically the least interesting case, as it provides no gradient for action selection (see
also the comment on the “Tragedy of the Greek Gods” towards the end of Sec. 4.5.4).
Fig. 4.3.d shows the empowerment map for an agent which can perceive the box,
the agent’s sensor input is both its own position and the position of the box. This dif-
ferent sensor configuration changes the empowerment map of the world. Being close
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to the box to affect it now allows the agent to “reach” more different outcomes, be-
cause different paths that lead to the same final agent location might affect the box
differently, thereby resulting in different final states. This results in higher empower-
ment closer to the box. Note that, comparing this to the previous scenario where the
box was not visible, the agent’s actions are not suddenly able to create a larger num-
ber of resulting world states. Rather, the only change is that the agent is now able to
discriminate between different world states that where present all along.
Figures 4.3.a and 4.3.c show the empowerment map for an non-pushable box, so
when the agent moves into the box’s square, its movement fails. As opposed to the
earlier cases, here we see that the empowerment around the box is lowered, because
the box is blocking the agents way, thereby reducing the number of states that the agent
can reach with its 5-step action sequence. We also see that the empowerment maps in
Fig. 4.3.a and 4.3.c are identical, and that it does not matter if the agent can perceive
the box or not. This connects back to our earlier arguments that empowerment is about
influencing the world one can perceive. As it is not possible for the agent to affect the
box’s positions, it is also not beneficial or relevant, from an empowerment perspective,
to perceive the box position. This also relates back to earlier arguments about sensor
and motor co-evolution. Once an agent loses it ability to affect the box, it might just as
well lose it ability to sense the box.
One important insight that is demonstrated by this experiment is how different sen-
sor and actuator configurations can lead to significantly different values for the state-
dependent empowerment maps. Thus, which state has the highest empowerment might
depend on an agent-sensor configuration (and not only on the world dynamics). This
can be helpful when using empowerment to define an action policy. If an agent chooses
its actions based on expected empowerment gain, then this method is a candidate for
causing an agent to change its behaviour by only calculating empowerment for partial
sensor input. For example, to drive an agent to focus on changing its location, then
selecting a corresponding location sensor might be a good strategy.
4.5.4 Horizon Extension
Extending the horizon, i.e., using a larger n in n-step empowerment, is another way
to change the actions under consideration. Since the n-step action sequences can be
treated just like atomic actions, lengthening the considered sequences creates more
distinct actions to consider, which usually also have a bigger effect on the environment.
Returning to the previous maze example, Fig. 4.4 illustrates how the empowerment
map changes for action sequences of different length.
The short-term, 1-step empowerment only takes into account its immediate local
surroundings. All that matters are if there are walls immediately next to the agent. In
general, an agent locked in a room with walls just one step away would have the same
empowerment as an agent on an open field. Also, this map only realizes 5 different
empowerment values because the world is deterministic, and there can be maximally
5 different outcome states.
With more steps, the empowerment map starts to reflect the immediate surround-
ing of the agent and measures, as discussed by Anthony et al. (2008), how “central”
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E ∈ [1; 2.32]
1-step Empowerment
E ∈ [1.58; 3.70]
2-step Empowerment
E ∈ [3.46; 5.52]
5-step Empowerment
E ∈ [4.50; 6.41]
10-step Empowerment
Fig. 4.4. The n-step empowerment map for the same maze with different horizons. Figure based
on (Klyubin et al. 2005a)
an agent is located on the graph of possible states. But, as discussed earlier, the world
could be shaped in a way that something just beyond the horizon of the agent’s em-
powerment calculation could change this completely. A possible solution would be to
further extend the horizon of the agent. One problem, which we will address in the
next section is that of computational feasibility.
Another problem is that the agent needs the sensor capacity to adequately reflect
an increase in possible actions. Consider the following case: computing, say, 100-
step empowerment, then the agent could reach every square from every other square,
creating a flat empowerment landscape with an empowerment of log(100) everywhere.
Since the agent itself is very (indeed maximally) powerful now, being able to reach
every state of the world, its empowerment landscape is meaningless, as empowerment
is incapable of distinguishing states via the number of options they offer. In principle,
an analogous phenomenon can be created by massively extending the sensor capacity.
Imagine an agent would not only be able to sense it current position, but also sense
every action it has taken in the past. Now the agent could differentiate between every
possible action sequence, as every one is reflected as a different sensor state. This again
leads to a flat empowerment landscape, with empowerment being the logarithm of all
possible actions.
So, in short, one has to be careful when the state-space of either actions or sensors
is much larger than the other. In this case it is possible that the channel capacity be-
comes the maximal entropy of the smaller variable for all possible contexts, thereby
creating a flat empowerment landscape. This phenomenon can be subsumed under the
plastic notion of the “Tragedy of the Greek Gods”: all-knowing, all-powerful agents
see no salient structure in the world and need to resort to avatars of limited knowledge
and power (in analogy to the intervention of the Greek gods with the human fighters
in the Trojan War) to attain any structured and meaningful interaction. In short, for
meaningful interaction to emerge from a method such as an empowerment landscape,
limitations in sensing and acting need to be present. The selection of appropriate levels
of power and resolution is a current research question.
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4.5.5 Impoverished Empowerment
While seeking the right resolution for actions and sensors can be an issue in worlds of
limited complexity, a much more imminent challenge is the fact that as the empower-
ment horizon grows, the number of action sequences one needs to consider grows ex-
ponentially with the horizon. Especially when noise is involved, this becomes quickly
infeasible.
To address this dilemma, Anthony et al. (2011) suggest a modified technique that
allows for the approximation of empowerment-like quantities for longer action se-
quences, arguing, among other, that this will bring the empowerment approach in prin-
ciple closer to what is cognitively plausible.
The basic idea of the impoverished empowerment approach is to consider all n-step
action sequences (as in the simple empowerment computation), but then to select only
a limited amount of sequences from these, namely those which contribute the most
to the empowerment at this state. From the endpoint of this “impoverished” action
sequence skeleton, this process is then repeated for another n-step sequence, thereby
iteratively building up longer action sequences.
In the deterministic case, the selection is done so that the collection of action se-
quences has the highest possible empowerment. So, if several action sequences would
lead to the same end state, only one of them would be chosen.
Interestingly, a small amount of noise is useful for this process, as it favours se-
lecting action sequences which are further apart, because their end states overlap less.
If no noise is present, then two action sequences which would end in neighbouring
locations would be just as valid as two that lead to completely different locations, but
the latter is more desirable as it spans a wider space of potential behaviours.
4.5.6 Sensor and Actuator Evolution
Since empowerment can be influenced by the choice of sensors, it is possible to ask
what choice of sensors is maximising an agent’s empowerment. Klyubin et al. (2005b,
2008) addressed this question by using a Genetic Algorithm-based optimization for a
scenario in which sensors are being evolved to maximize an agent’s empowerment. An
agent is located in an infinite two-dimensional grid world. On each turn it can take one
of five different actions which are to move in one of four directions, or to do nothing.
Each location now has a value representing the concentration of a marker substance
which is inversely proportional to the distance of the current location to the center at
location (0, 0).
In this scenario, the agents sensors can change, both in positioning and number. A
sensor configuration is defined by where each of the n sensors of the agent is located
relative to the agent. The sensor value has n states, and represents which of the n
sensors detects the highest concentration value of the marker.
Klyubin et al. (2005b, 2008) then evolved the agents sensor configuration to max-
imise empowerment for different starting locations with respect to the centre. So, for
example, they evolved the sensor configurations to achieve the highest empowerment
when the agent starts its movement at location (0, 0). To avoid degeneracy, a slight
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cost factor for the number of sensors was added. In this way the adaptation has to eval-
uate if the added cost of further sensors are worth the increase in empowerment. The
resulting sensor configurations for a 4-step empowerment calculation can be seen in
Figure 4.5.
Fig. 4.5. The Figures show what sensor configurations empowerment evolves for different start-
ing positions. The first number indicates how many spaces east of the center the agent starts,
and the second number is the resulting empowerment value of the sensor configuration. Figure
taken from (Klyubin et al. 2008)
The result was unsurprisingly that different starting positions would lead to dif-
ferent sensor layouts. More interestingly, they realized that the space of possible solu-
tions can be more constrained in some places, so there is only one good solution, while
other locations offer several different, nearly equally empowered solutions. More im-
portantly is the observation that empowerment agnostically selects modalities which
are most appropriate for the various starting locations. Consider, for instance, Fig. 4.5
which shows how the sensors are placed relative to the agent as the agent moves in-
creasingly away from the center of the world, and to the right of it. The first images
show the sensor placement when the agent is at the center of the world. The sensors are
placed with more-or-less precision around the center, and there is some indifference as
to their exact placement.
In the second row, when the agent has been moved seven and more fields to the
right of the centre, a more prominent “blob” is placed at around the location of the
centre (the diagram shows the relative placement of the sensors with respect to the
agent, so a blob of black dots is covering roughly the location at which the centre of
the world will be with respect to the agent.
Finally, as the agent moves further to the right (end of second and last row in
Fig. 4.5), a striking effect takes place: the blob sensor, which roughly determines a
two-dimensional location of the centre, collapses into a “heading” sensor which is no
longer a two-dimensional blob, but rather has 1-dimensional character. This demon-
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strates that empowerment is able to switch to different modalities (or, in this case,
from a 2-dimensional to a 1-dimensional sensor). Because of its information-theoretic
nature, empowerment is not explicitly using any assumptions about modality or di-
mensionality of sensors. The resulting morphologies are purely a result of the selection
pressure via empowerment in interaction with the dynamics and structure of the world
under consideration.
Another result of the evolutionary scenario involved the evolution of actuators.
Without repeating the full details that can be found in (Klyubin et al. 2008), we
would like to mention one important result, namely that the placement of actuators via
empowerment-driven evolution, unlike the sensors, was extremely unspecific. Many
configurations led to maximum empowerment solutions. The authors suggest that this
results as a consequence of the agent being unable to choose what form the ’infor-
mation’ takes, that it has to extract from the environment. Hence, the sensors have
to adapt to the information structure available in the environment, leaving the agent
free to choose its actions. Therefore many different actuator settings can be used as
the agent can utilize each of them to full effect by generation of suitable action se-
quences. This is an indicator that an agent’s action choices should be a more valuable
and “concentrated” source of information than the information extracted from the en-
vironment, as every action choice is significant, while sensoric information needs to be
“scooped” in on a wide front to capture some relevant features. This insight has been
taken onboard in later work in form of the the concept of digested information (Salge
and Polani 2011) where agents observe other agents because their actions are more
informationally dense than other aspects of the environment. The core idea of digested
information is that relevant information (as defined in (Polani et al. 2006)) is often
spread out in the environment, but since an agent needs to act upon the information it
obtains, the same information is also present in the agent’s actions. Because the agent’s
action state-space is usually much smaller than the state-space of the environment, the
agent “concentrates” the relevant information in it actions. From the perspective of an-
other, similar agent this basically means that the agent digests the relevant information
and then provides it in a more compact format. It should be noted that all structure
in the above example emerges purely from informational considerations; no other cost
structure (such as e.g. energy costs) have been taken into account to shape the resulting
features.
4.5.7 Multi-Agent Empowerment
If two or more agents share an environment, so that their actions all influence the
state of the world, then their empowerment becomes intertwined. Capdepuy (2010);
Capdepuy et al. (2007, 2012) investigate this phenomenon in detail. Here, due to lack
of space, we will limit ourselves to briefly outline his results.
If both agents selfishly optimize their empowerment, then the outcome depends
heavily on the scenario. A fully formal categorization is still outstanding, but the qual-
itative phenomenon can be described in terms similar to different game solution types
in game theory. One finds situations that are analogous to zero-sum games where the
empowerment of one agent can only be raised to the detriment of the other. In other sit-
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uations, selfish empowerment maximisation leads to overall high empowerment, and,
finally, there are scenarios where agent’s strategies converge onto the analoga of intri-
cate equilibria reminiscent of the Nash equilibria in games.
An interesting aspect in relation to biology is Capdepuy’s work on the emergence of
structure from selfish empowerment maximisation (Capdepuy et al. 2007). The model
consists of a two-dimensional grid world where agents are equipped with sensors that
measure the density of other agents in the directions around them. In this case, there
is a tension between achieving proximity to other agents (to attain any variation in
sensor input, as empty space does not provide any) and being sufficiently distant (as
to attain sufficient freedom for action and not to be stuck without ability to move);
this tension, in turn, provides an incentive to produce nontrivial dynamical structures.
Some examples of agent populations evolved for greedy empowerment maximization
and some of the better empowered structures resulting from this process can be seen
in Fig. 4.6 Capdepuy et al. (2007).
Fig. 4.6. Structures resulting from agent behaviour that was evolved to maximise the agents’
individual empowerment. Each black dot in the figure represents an agent in one of the
empowerment-maximizing scenarios. Agents are equipped with directional density sensors,
measuring the number of other agents present in that particular direction. Creating structures
becomes beneficial for the agents, as it gives features to the environment that allow different
resulting sensor inputs. The different structures are high empowered solutions of the artificial
evolution. Figure taken from (Capdepuy 2010)
.
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4.6 Continuous Empowerment
The empowerment computations that we considered earlier were all operating in dis-
crete spaces. But if we want to apply empowerment to the real world we need to con-
sider that many problems, especially those related to motion or motor control, are con-
tinuous in nature. We could apply naive discretizations with finer and finer resolutions,
but this will quickly lead to large state and actions spaces, with a forbidding number
of options where direct computation of empowerment become very computationally
expensive (Klyubin et al. 2008); therefore, different approaches need to be taken to
deal with continuous dynamics effectively.
In this section, we will take a closer look at empowerment for continuous actuator
and sensor variables. Compared to the discrete case, while channel capacity is still
well defined for continuous input/output spaces, there are some important conceptual
differences to be considered as compared to the discrete case.
One problem, as we shall illustrate, is that the continuous channel capacity could
— in theory — be infinite. The reason for this is as follows: if there is no noise, and
arbitrary continuous actions can be selected, these actions now allow to inject continu-
ous, i.e. real-valued quantities (or vectors) into the world state. Reading in their (again)
noiseless effect through real-valued sensors means that the full precision of a real num-
ber can be used in such a case. As arbitrary amounts of information can be stored in
an infinite precision — noiseless — real number, this implies (in nondegenerate cases)
an infinite channel capacity. Of course, such a situation is not realistic; in particular,
relevant real-world systems always have noise and therefore the channel capacity will
be limited.
However, when modeling a deterministic system with floating-point precision in
simulation, there is no natural noise level. In a nondegenerate system, empowerment
can be made as large as the logarithm of the number of actions (action sequences)
available. This is, of course, meaningless. To be meaningful, one needs to endow the
system with additional assumptions (such as an appropriate noise level) which are not
required in the deterministic case.
But the main problem in the continuous case is that there is at the time of this review
no known analytic solution to determine the channel capacity for a general continuous
channel. To address this problem, a number of methods to approximate continuous
channel capacity have been introduced. We will discuss them and how they can be
used to compute empowerment.
We will briefly discuss naive binning, then the Monte Carlo Integration method
developed by (Jung et al. 2011), and then focus mostly on the quasi-linear Gaussian
approximation, which is fast to compute.
4.6.1 Continuous Information Theory
The analogy to discrete entropy is rigorously defined for continuous random variables
as differential entropy
h(X) = −
∫
X
p(x) log(p(x)) dx , (4.21)
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where p(x) now denotes not the probability, but the probability density function of X ,
defined over a support set of X ⊂ R. Similarly, the conditional differential entropy is
defined as
h(X|Y ) = −
∫
Y
p(y)
∫
X
p(x|y) log(p(x|y)) dxdy . (4.22)
The differential entropies cannot be directly interpreted in the same way as discrete
entropies: they can become infinite or even negative. However, without delving too
much into their individual interpretation, we will just state here that the difference of
two differential entropy terms again can be interpreted as a proper mutual information:
I(X;Y ) := h(X) − h(X|Y ), which shares essentially all characteristics of the dis-
crete mutual information7. Thus, consequently, the channel capacity is again defined
by maximising the mutual information for the input probability density function
E = C(A→ S) = max
p(a)
I(A;S). (4.23)
We will still be dealing with discrete time steps. Just like in the discrete case, we will
use the notationAt and St not just for single, but also for compound random variables.
So, for each time t, both variables At and St can consist of vectors of multiple random
variables. The variables A and (where relevant) S itself are then again a selection of
actuator and sensor variables at different times t, so for example, the actuator input for
n-step empowerment might be written compactly as A = (At, ..., At+n−1).
4.6.2 Infinite Channel Capacity
As mentioned above, in contrast to the discrete case, the continuous channel capacity
can be infinite for some p(s|a). Formally, this results from the fact that differential
entropy can become negative. For instance, it becomes negative infinity for a Dirac
δx(.) “distribution”. The Dirac “distribution” is a probability measure concentrated
on a single point: it can be mathematically defined in a precise fashion, but for the
following discussion, the intuition is sufficient that δx(.) is normalized (the integral
over this “distribution” is 1), and is 0 everywhere with exception of the one point x at
which it is concentrated, where it assumes an infinite value.
To illustrate, imagine that the channel p(s|a) exactly reproduces the real-valued
input value of a ∈ R, i.e. that it implements s = a, i.e. p(s|a) ≡ δa(s). Every input
a precisely determines the output s, so h(S|a) = −∞. This remains negative infinity
when we integrate over all possible inputs, so h(S|A) = −∞. If we now choose for
p(a) the uniform input distribution between 0 and 1, which has a differential entropy
of 0, we then get the following mutual information8
7One exception is that the continuous version of mutual information can become infinite in
the continuum. This, however, is perfectly consistent with the ability to store infinite amount of
information in continuous variables and does not change anything substantial in the interpreta-
tion.
8Strictly spoken, we should denote this quantity as differential mutual information, but un-
like the differential entropy, this term retains the same interpretation in the continuous as in the
discrete case, and therefore we will not especially qualify it by terming it “differential”.
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I(A;S) = h(S)− h(S|A) = h(A)− (−∞) =∞ . (4.24)
It holds H(S) = H(A), because the channel just copies the input distribution to the
output. Since this is the largest possible value, this is also the channel capacity.
4.6.3 Continuous Empowerment Approximation
While channel capacity is well defined for any relationship between S and A, it can
only be computed for a subset of all possible scenarios. We will here approximate the
model of the world with one for which empowerment can be computed. The following
section discusses different approaches for doing so.
4.6.4 Binning
The most straightforward and naive approximation for continuous empowerment is to
discretize all involved continuous variables and then compute the channel as described
in the discrete empowerment section.
However, there are different ways to bin real-valued numbers and, as Olsson et al.
(2005) demonstrated, they clearly affect the resulting informational values. Uniform
binning considers the support of a real-valued random variable (i.e. the set of values
of x for which p(x) > 0), splits it into equally sized intervals and assigns to each
real number the bin it falls into. Of course, this does not necessarily result in the same
number of events in each bin and, furthermore, many bins can be left empty or with
very few events while others contain many events. This unevenness can mean that
significant “information” (in the colloquial sense) in the data is being discarded. The
response is to choose the binning in a not necessarily equally spaced way, that ensures
that all bins are used, and that the events are well distributed. This is achieved by Max-
Entropy binning where one adaptively resizes the bins so the resulting distribution has
the highest entropy, which usually results in bins containing the approximately same
number of events Olsson et al. (2005).
There are two caveats for this case: If adaptive binning is chosen, one needs to take
care that the informational values of different measurements are comparable, and that
the binning is the same throughout the same context of use. Therefore, it is important to
choose the binning in advance, say, adapted only to the overall, context-free channel,
and not adapt to each state-dependent channel separately. The second caveat is that,
while adaptive binning distributes the events more-or-less evenly over the bins, this
can thin out the sampling very considerably and cause the bins to be almost empty or
containing very few elements each. This can induce the appearance of nonzero mutual
information which, however, is spurious. In this case, it is better to choose a binning
that is wide enough to ensure a sufficient number of events per bin. Both approaches
require the availability of actual samples, so if the channel in question is only specified
as a continuous conditional probability, it is necessary to generate random samples
based on p(s|a).
A final note on information estimation: much more robust approaches for mutual
information estimation are known, such as the Kraskov-Sto¨gbauer-Grassberger (KSG)
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estimator (Kraskov et al. 2004). Unfortunately, this method is not suitable for use with
empowerment, as it requires the full joint distribution of the variables to be given in
advance. When computing empowerment, however, one iteratively selects an input
distribution, computes a joint distribution and then applies the information estimator.
This means that if one uses the KSG-estimator, it affects the joint distributions and
hence its own estimates of mutual information at later iterations of the process, and
thus the conditions for correct operation of KSG cease to hold9.
4.6.5 Evaluation of Binning
One problem with this approach is that it can introduce binning artefacts. Consider the
following example: imagine one bins by proper rounding to integers. In this case, out-
comes such as, say, 0.6 and 1.4 become the same state, while 1.4 and 1.6 are considered
different. If now an agent which moves along the real valued line by an amount of 0.2
at each time step, this binning would make the agent appear to be more empowered at
1.5 then it would be at 1.0, because it could move to two different resulting states from
1.5. If the binning would reflect true sensoric resolution of the agent, this would con-
form with the empowerment model of being able to resolve the corresponding states;
however, in our example, we did not imply anything like that — the underlying con-
tinuous structure is completely uniform, and we did not introduce any special sensoric
structure. Thus, the difference in empowerment is a pure artefact introduced by the
binning itself.
Another problem that emerges with the use of a binning approach is the right choice
of granularity. If too few bins are chosen, then, while one has a good number of samples
in the bins, interesting structural effect and correlations are lost. If too many bins are
chosen, then many (or all bins) contain very few samples, perhaps as few as only
one or even none. Such a sparse sampling can significantly overestimate the mutual
information of the involved variables. Another problem, specifically in conjunction
with empowerment, is that such a sparse sampling is often likely to cause one action to
produce exactly one distinguishable sensoric outcome. This means that empowerment
reaches its maximum log |A| for every context r depriving it of any meaning. However,
if the resolution is high enough and sufficiently many samples are collected, binning
can produce a quickly implemented (but typically slow to compute) approximation
for empowerment. Examples of its application to the simple pendulum can be seen in
(Klyubin et al. 2008).
4.6.6 Jung’s Monte Carlo Integration
Another approximation to compute empowerment which can still deal with any kind
of p(s|a) is Monte Carlo Integration (Jung et al. 2011). It is computed by sampling the
outcomes of applying a representative set of available action sequences.
Assume that you have a model, so for a state r you can take actions av , with
v = 1, ..., n, and draw NMC samples, which will result in sensor states sv,j , with
9The authors thank Tobias Jung for this information (private communication).
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j = 1, ..., NMC . This method then approximates the term dv,k from Eq. (4.16) in the
BA by
dv,k ≈ 1
NMC
NMC∑
j=1
log
[
p(sv,j |r,av)∑n
i=1 p(sv,j |r,ai)pik
]
. (4.25)
To compute this the model needs to provide a way to compute how probable it
is that the outcome of one action was produced by another. The necessary noise in
the model basically introduces a “distance measure” that indicates how hard it is to
distinguish two different actions.
One simple model is to assume that p(s|r,av) is a multivariate Gaussian (depen-
dent on the current state of the world r), or can be reasonably well-approximated by
it, i.e.,
s|r,av ∼ N(µv,Σv) (4.26)
where µv = (µv,1, ..., µv,n)T is the mean of the Gaussian and the covariance matrix
is given by Σv = diag(σ2v,1, ..., σ
2
v,n). The mean and covariance will depend upon the
action av and the state r. Samples from the distribution will be denoted s˜v and can be
generated using standard algorithms.
The following algorithm summarises how to approximate the empowerment E(r)
given a state r ∈ R and transition model p(s|r,av):
1. Input:
a) Specify state r whose empowerment is to be calculated.
b) For every action av with v = 1, ..., n, define a (Gaussian) state transition
model p(s|r,av), which is fully specified by its mean µv and covariance Σv .
2. Initialise:
a) p0(av) := 1/n for v = 1, ..., n.
b) Draw NMC samples s˜v,i each, according to distribution density p(s|r,av) =
N(µv,Σv) for v = 1, ..., n.
c) Evaluate p(s˜v,i|r,aµ) for all v = 1, ...n; µ = 1, ...n; and sample i =
1, ..., NMC .
3. Iterate the following variables for k = 1, 2, ... until |Ek − Ek−1| <  or the
maximum number of iterations is reached:
a) zk := 0, Ek−1 := 0
b) For v = 1, ..., n
i. dv,k :=
1
NMC
NMC∑
j=1
log
[
p(s˜v,j |r,av)∑n
i=1 p(s˜v,j |r,ai)pik
]
ii. Ek := Ek−1 + pk−1(av) · dv,k−1
iii. pk := pk−1(av) · exp(dv,k−1)
iv. zk := zk + pk(av)
c) For v = 1, ...n
i. pk(av) := pk(av) · z−1k
4. Output:
a) Empowerment E(r) ≈ Ek−1 (estimated).
b) Distribution p(a) achieving the maximum mutual information.
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4.6.7 Evaluation of Monte Carlo Integration
Monte Carlo Integration can still deal with the same generic distributions p(s|a) as the
binning approach, and it removes the artefacts caused by the arbitrary boundaries of
the bins. On the downside, it requires a model with a noise assumption. In the solution
suggested by Jung et al. (2011) this lead to the assumption of Gaussian Noise.
The other problem is computability. For good approximations the number of se-
lected representative action sequences should be high, but this also leads to a quick
growth of computation time. The several applications showcased in (Jung et al. 2011)
all had to be computed off-line, which makes them infeasible for robotic applications.
4.6.8 Quasi-Linear Gaussian Approximation
In the previous section we saw that Jung’s Monte Carlo Integration method could deal
with the rather general case where the relationship between actuators and sensor can
be characterized by s = f(r, a) + Z, where f is a deterministic mapping, and Z is
some form of added noise. The noise is necessary to limit the channel capacity, and
an integral part of the Monte Carlo Integration in Eq. 4.25. While the noise can have
different distributions, Jung’s example assumed it to be Gaussian.
We will now outline how the assumption of Gaussian noise, together with an as-
sumption regarding the nature of f , will allow us to accelerate the empowerment ap-
proximation. Consider now actuation-sensing mappings of the form s = f(r, a) +
N(0, Nr), i.e. which can be described by a deterministic mapping f on which Gaus-
sian noise (which may depend on r) is superimposed10.
In principle, if the actionsA were distributed in an arbitrarily small neighbourhood
around 0, one would need f to be differentiable in awith the derivativeDaf depending
continuously on r. In practice, that neighbourhood will not be arbitrarily small, so the
mapping from a to s needs to be “sufficiently well” approximated at all states r by an
affine (or shifted linear) function in fr(a) for the allowed distributions of actions p(a).
To limit the channel capacity there has to be some constraint on the possible action
distributions, and the linear approximation has to be sufficiently good for the actions
that A can actually attain.11
In other words, assuming the channel can be adequately approximated by a linear
transformation applied to A with added Gaussian noise, then it is possible to speed up
the empowerment calculation significantly by reducing the general problem of contin-
uous channel capacity to parallel Gaussian channels which can be solved with well-
established algorithms. This provides us with the quasi-linear Gaussian approximation
for empowerment which will now be presented in detail.
10We will treat this as centred noise, with a mean of 0, but this is not necessary, as any non-
zero mean would just shift the resulting distribution, which would leave the differential entropies
and mutual information unaffected.
11We will not make this notion more precise or derive any error bounds at this point; we just
informally assume that the Gaussian action distribution A is concentrated well enough for fr to
appear linear in a.
32 Christoph Salge, Cornelius Glackin and Daniel Polani
Let S be a multi-dimensional, continuous random variable defined over the vector
space Rn. Let A be a multidimensional random variable defined over Rm. As in the
discrete,A is the action variable, and S the perception variable. According to the quasi-
linear Gaussian approximation assumption, we assume that there is a linear transfor-
mation T : Rm → Rn that allows us to express the relation between these variables
via
S = TA+ Z. (4.27)
Z is a suitable multi-dimensional, Gaussian variable defined over Rn, modelling the
combined acting/sensing noise in the system and is assumed to be independent of A
and S.
Consider first the simpler white noise case. Here we assume that the noise in each
dimension q ≤ n of Z is independent of the noise in all other dimensions, and has a
normal distribution with Zq ∼ N(0, Nq) for each dimension (where Nq depends on
the dimension). This particular form of noise can be interpreted as having n sensoric
channels where each channel q is subject to a source of independent Gaussian noise.
We now further introduce a limit to the power P available to the actions A, i.e. we
are going to consider only action distributions A with E(A2) ≤ P . The reason for that
is that without this constraint, the amplitude of A could be made arbitrarily large and
this again would render all outcomes distinguishable and thus empowerment infinite12.
The actual mean of the distributions is irrelevant for our purpose, as a constant shift
does not affect the differential entropies. However, we need to ensure that the actuation
range considered does not extend the size for which our linearity assumption holds.
It is plausible to consider this limitation as a physical power constraint13. Under
these constraints, the quantity of interest now becomes
E = max
p(a):E(A2)≤P
I(S;A) (4.28)
and the maximum being attained for normally distributed A (thus we only need to
consider Gaussian distributions for A in the first place).
4.6.9 MIMO channel capacity
Now, assume for a moment that, in addition to our assumption of independent noise,
the variance of the noise Z in each dimension has the same value, namely 1, then the
problem becomes equivalent to computing the channel capacity for a linear, Multiple-
Input/Multiple-Output channel with additive and isotropic Gaussian noise. Though the
12This specific power limit also implies that the optimal input distributions for the channel
capacity results is Gaussian (Cover and Thomas 1991).
13This point is subtle: throughout the text, we had made a point that empowerment is deter-
mined by the structure of the actuation-perception loop, but otherwise purely informational. In
particular, we did not include any further assumptions about the physics of the system. In the
quasi-linear Gaussian case, the choice of a “physics-like” quadratic form of power limitation is
only owed to the fact that it makes the problem tractable. Other constraints are likely to be more
appropriate for a realistic robotic actuator model, but need to be addressed in future work.
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methods to compute this quantity are well established in the literature, for reasons of
self-containedness, we reiterate them here.
The MIMO problem can be solved by standard methods (Telatar 1999), namely
by applying a Singular Value Decomposition (SVD) to the transformation matrix T ,
which decomposes T as
T = UΣV T (4.29)
where U and V are unitary matrices and Σ is a diagonal matrix with non-negative real
values on the diagonal. This allow us to transform Eq. (4.27) to
UTS = ΣV TA+ UTZ. (4.30)
It can be shown that each dimension of the resulting vectorial variables UTS, ΣV TA
and UTZ can be treated as an independent channel (see (Telatar 1999)), and thus
reducing the computation of the overall channel capacity to computing the channel ca-
pacity for linear, parallel channels with added Gaussian noise, as in (Cover and Thomas
1991),
C = max
Pi
∑
i
1
2
log
(
1 +
σiPi
E
[
(UTZ)2i
]) = max
Pi
∑
i
1
2
log(1 + σiPi) (4.31)
where σi are the singular values of Σ, and Pi is the average power used in the i-th
channel, following the constraint that∑
i
Pi ≤ P. (4.32)
The simplification in the last step of Eq. (4.31) is based on the assumption of isotropic
noise. Because the expected value for the noise is 1.0 and the unitary matrix applied to
Z does not scale, but only rotates Z, the noise retains its original value of 1.0.
We remind that the channel capacity achieving distribution for a simple linear chan-
nel with added Gaussian Noise is Gaussian (Cover and Thomas 1991). In particular,
the optimal input distribution for each subchannel is a Gaussian with a variance of Pi.
The optimal power distribution which maximizes Eq. (4.31) can then be found with
the water-filling algorithm (Cover and Thomas 1991). The basic idea is to first assign
power to the channel with the lowest amount of noise. This has an effect that could be
described as one of “diminishing returns”: once a certain power level is reached, where
adding more power to that channel has the same return as adding to the next best chan-
nel, additional power is now allocated to the two best channels. This is iterated to the
next critical level and so on, until all power is allocated. Depending on the available
total power, not all channels necessarily get power assigned to them.
We can also see, directly from the formula in Eq. (4.31), that since we divide by the
variance of the noise Z, this value needs to be larger than zero. For vanishing noise, the
channel capacity becomes infinite. Only the presence of noise induces an “overlap” of
outcome states that allows one to obtain meaningful empowerment values. However,
this is not a significant limitation in practice, as virtually all applications need to take
into account actuator, system and/or sensor noise.
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4.6.10 Coloured Noise
In a more general model, the Gaussian noise added to the multi-inputs, multi-output
channel might also be coloured, meaning that the noise distributions in the differ-
ent sensor dimensions are not independent. Let us assume that the noise is given by
Z ∼ N(0,Ks), where Ks is the covariance matrix of the noise. As above, we assume
that the distribution has a mean of zero, which is without loss of generality since trans-
lations are information invariant. The relationship between S and A is again expressed
as
S = T ′A+ Z ′. (4.33)
Conveniently, this can also be reduced to a channel with i.i.d. noise. For this, note
that rotation, translation and scaling operators do not affect the mutual information
I(S;A). We start by expressing Z ′ as
Z ′ = U
√
ΣZV T , (4.34)
where Z ∼ N(0, I) is isotropic noise with a variance of 1, and UΣV T = Ks is the
SVD of Ks. U and T are orthogonal matrices, and Σ contains the singular values.
Note that all singular values have to be strictly larger than zero, otherwise there would
be a channel in the system without noise, which would allow the empowerment maxi-
mizer to inject all power into the zero-noise component of the channel and to achieve
infinite channel capacity.
√
Σ is a matrix that contains the square roots of the singular
values, which should scale the variance of the isotropic noise to the singular values.
The orthogonal matrices then rotate the distributions, so that they resemble Z ′.
If we consider
√
Σ
−1
, a diagonal matrix whose entries are the inverse of the square
root of the singular values in Σ, this allows us to reformulate:
S = TA+ U
√
ΣZV T (4.35)
UTSV = UTTAV +
√
ΣZ (4.36)√
Σ
−1
UTSV =
√
Σ
−1
UTTAV + Z (4.37)√
Σ
−1
UTS =
√
Σ
−1
UTTA+ ZV T (4.38)√
Σ
−1
UTS =
√
Σ
−1
UTTA+ Z (4.39)
The last step follows from the fact that the rotation of isotropic Gaussian noise re-
mains isotropic Gaussian noise. This reduces the whole problem to a MIMO channel
with isotropic noise and with the same channel capacity. We simply redefine the trans-
formation matrix T as
T =
√
Σ
−1
UTT ′, (4.40)
and solve the channel capacity for S = TA+ Z, as outlined in section 4.6.9.
4.6.11 Evaluation of QLG Empowerment
The advantage of the quasi-linear Gaussian approximation is that it is quick to com-
pute, the computational bottleneck being the calculation of a singular value decompo-
sition that has the same dimensions as the sensors and actuators.
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The drawbacks are its introduction of several assumptions. Like Jung’s integration,
the approximation forces us to assume Gaussian noise. However, a more aggressive
assumption than Jung’s approximation is that the QLG approximation also needs a
locally linear model. So it is not possible to represent locally non-linear relationships
between the actions and sensors. In particular the abrupt emergence of novel degrees
of freedom which the empowerment formalism is so apt at discovering (see above,
e.g. box pushing in Sec. 4.5.3) becomes softened by the Gaussian bell of the agent’s
actuations.
Finally, the quasi-linear Gaussian approximation also introduces a new free pa-
rameter, the power-constraint P which will be discussed in a later example. A more
detailed examination of QLG empowerment can be found in (Salge et al. 2012).
4.7 Continuous Examples
We are aware of currently only two publications dealing with continuous empower-
ment. The first, by Jung et al. (2011), provides a good technical tutorial, and intro-
duces the Monte Carlo Integration technique. Furthermore, it demonstrates that those
states generally chosen as goals have high state-dependent empowerment, and that an
empowerment-driven controller will tend to drive the system into them, even when ini-
tialized from a far away starting point. So, for example, the simple pendulum swings
up, and stabilizes in the upright position, even when multiple swing-up phases are
required; unlike traditional Reinforcement Learning, there is no value function that
needs to be learnt over the whole phase space, but only the transition dynamics, and
that needs only to be determined around the actual path taken. In principle, the algo-
rithm does not need to visit any states but those in the neighbourhood of the path taken
by the empowerment-driven controller. The empowerment-driven control method can
be applied also to other, quite more intricate models, such as bicycle riding or the ac-
robot scenario (double-pendulum hanging from the top joint and driven by a motor at
the middle joint).
The second paper (Salge et al. 2012) discusses the quasi-linear Gaussian method as
a faster approximation for empowerment, and focusses on the pendulum; both to com-
pare the QLG method with previous approximations, and to investigate how different
parameters affect the empowerment map. In the following section we will use the sim-
ple pendulum from the second paper to outline some of the challenges in applying
continuous empowerment.
4.7.1 Pendulum
The scenario we will focus on is that of a simple pendulum, because it incarnates many
features typical for the continuous empowerment scenarios. First we will produce an
empowerment map, which assigns an empowerment value for each state the pendulum
can be in. Then we demonstrate empowerment-driven control; an algorithm that gen-
erates actions for the pendulum by greedily maximising its expected empowerment in
the following step.
36 Christoph Salge, Cornelius Glackin and Daniel Polani
We start by observing that the pendulum’s current state at the time t is completely
characterized by its angle φ and its angular velocity φ˙.
For the model we time-discretize the input. So, the actuator variable A contains
real values at, which represents the external acceleration applied to the pendulum. So,
at time t, the motor acceleration is set to at, and this acceleration is then applied for
the duration ∆t. At the end of ∆t, we will consider the system to be in time t + ∆t,
and the next value is applied.
4.7.2 Action Selection
In general, just having a state-dependent utility function, which assigns a utility to
each state (such as empowerment) does not immediately provide a control strategy.
One way to address this is to implement a greedy action selection strategy, where each
action is chosen based on the immediate expected gain in empowerment. Note that
empowerment is not a true value function, i.e. following its maximum local gradient
does not necessarily correspond to optimizing some cumulated reward.
For the discrete and deterministic case, implementing a greedy control is simple.
Since we have local model knowledge, we know what state each action a will lead
to. We can then evaluate the empowerment for each action a that can be taken in the
current state, and pick that action that leads to the subsequent state with the largest
empowerment. This basically provides a gradient ascent approach (modulated by the
effect of the action on the dynamics) on the empowerment landscape, with all is bene-
fits and drawbacks.
If we are dealing with a discrete but noisy system, one needs to specify in more
detail what a “greedy” action selection should look like, since empowerment is not a
utility function in the strict sense of utility theory, and the average empowerment over
the successor states is not the same as the empowerment of the averaged dynamics.
This means that one has different ways of selecting the desired action for the next step.
However, the most straightforward way remains, of course, the selection of the
highest average empowerment when a particular action is selected. Assume that, given
an action a, and a fixed starting state which we do not denote separately, one has the
probability p(s|a) of getting into a subsequent state s14. Each of these successor states
s has an associated empowerment value E(s). Thus, the expected empowerment for
carrying out the action a is given by
E[E(S)|a] =
∑
s∈S
E(s)p(s|a) (4.41)
and one selects the action with the highest expected empowerment.
The necessity of distinction of deterministic and noisy cases becomes even more
prominent in the continuous case, where the situation is more complicated. As we have
to treat the continuum as a noisy system, there is usually no unique resulting state for
an action a, but rather a continuous distribution density of states p(s|a). Ideally, one
would integrate the empowerment values over this distribution, similar to Eq. (4.41),
14To simplify the argument, we consider here only fully observed states s.
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but since empowerment cannot be expressed as a simple, integrable function, this is
not practicable. One solution is to simply look at the mean of a sampled distribution
over the resulting states and average their empowerment. At this point, however, no
bounds have been derived on how well this value represents the empowerment values
in the distribution of output states.
The continuity of actions creates another problem. Even if we can compute the
expected empowerment for a given action, then we still need to select for which actions
we want to evaluate their subsequent empowerment. Again, one possible option is to
sample several actions a, distributed in a regular fashion; for example, one could look
at the resulting states for maximal positive acceleration, for no acceleration at all, and
for maximal negative acceleration, and then select the best. This may miss the action
a with the highest expected empowerment which might fall somewhere between these
sample points. Potential for future work would lie in developing an efficient method to
avoid expensive searches for the highest-valued successive expected empowerment.
4.7.3 Resulting Control
In Fig. 4.7 we can see a empowerment map for the pendulum, and the resulting trajec-
tory generated by greedy empowerment control. The controller sampled over 5 pos-
sible actuation choices, and chose the one where the resulting state had the highest
expected empowerment.
In this specific case, the pendulum swings up and comes to rest in the upright po-
sition. This solution, while typical, is not unique. Varying the parameters for time step
length and power constraint can produce different behaviour, such as cyclic oscillation
and resting in the lower position. We will discuss these cases further below.
One interesting observation to note here is that the empowerment of the pendu-
lum is not strictly increasing over the run, even though the control chooses the action
that leads to the most empowered successor state. If one considers the trajectory, it is
possible to see that the pendulum passes through regions where the empowerment low-
ers again. This can be seen in Fig. 4.7 where the trajectory passes through the darker
regions of lower empowerment after already being in much lighter regions of the em-
powerment map. This is due to the specific dynamics of the system, in which one can
only control the acceleration of the pendulum, but, of course, not its position change,
which is mediated by the current velocity. So while the controller chooses the high-
est empowered future state, all future states have lower empowerment than the current
state.
Contrast this with the discrete maze case: in the latter, the agent could maintain any
state of the environment, i.e. it position, indefinitely, by doing nothing. Greedy control
in the maze therefore moves the agent to increasingly higher empowered states, until
it would reach a local optimum, and then remain there.
Strikingly, local empowerment maxima seem to be less of a problem in the pendu-
lum model (which is, in this respect, very similar to the mountain-car problem (Sutton
and Barto 1998)). One reason turns out to be that the pendulum cannot maintain cer-
tain positions. If the pendulum has a non-zero speed, then its next position will be a
different one, because the system cannot maintain both the speed and position of the
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Fig. 4.7. Graph depicting the state space of a pendulum and its associated empowerment values.
The solid line shows the trajectory of a pendulum in this state space, controlled by a greedy
empowerment maximization algorithm based on the underlying Gaussian quasilinear empower-
ment landscape (shown in the background). For comparison of control, the dashed line shows
the trajectory created by a greedy maximisation based on a Monte Carlo Gaussian empowerment
landscape (not depicted here).
pendulum at the same time. This sometimes forces the pendulum to enter states that are
of lower empowerment than its current state. In the pendulum example this works out
well in traversing the low empowered regions; and the continued local optimization of
empowerment happens to lead to later, even higher empowered regions.
It is an open question to characterize actuation-perception structures which would
be particularly amenable for the local empowerment optimization to actually achieve
global empowerment optimization or at least a good approximation of global empow-
erment optimization. At this point, it is clear that sharp changes in the empowerment
landscape (e.g. discovery of new degrees of freedom, e.g. because of the presence of
a new manipulable object) need to be inside the local exploration range of the action
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sequences used to compute empowerment. However, in the case of the pendulum, the
maximally empowered point of the upright pendulum seems to “radiate” its basin of
attraction into sufficiently far regions of the state space for the local greedy optimiza-
tion to pick this up. The characterization of the properties that the dynamics of the
system needs to have for this to be successful is a completely open question at this
point. Given the examples studied in (Jung et al. 2011), a cautious hypothesis may
suggest that dynamic scenarios are good candidates for such a phenomenon.
4.7.4 Power Constraint
A closer look at the different underlying empowerment landscapes of the quasi-linear
approximation in Fig. 4.8 shows their changes in regard to power constraint P and
time step length ∆t.
How the change in the time step duration ∆t affects the empowerment, and also
how it leads to worse approximations is studied in greater detail in (Salge et al. 2012).
In general, it is not surprising that empowerment is indeed affected by it, in particular
as the time step duration is closely related to the horizon length. The basic insight is,
however, that a greater time step length allows a further look-ahead into the future, at
the cost of a worsening approximation with the local linear model.
A more interesting effect in regard to the general applicability of the fast QLG
method is the varying power constraint P . In general, an increase in power will result
in an increase in empowerment, no matter where in the state space the system is. This
is not immediately visible in the figures shown, since the colouring of the graphs is
normalized, so the black and white correspond to the lowest and highest empowerment
value in the respective subgraph.
A more unexpected effect, however, is a potential inversion of the empowerment
landscape as seen in Fig. 4.8. Inversion means that for two specific points in the state
space it might be that for one power level the first has a higher empowerment than the
other, but for a different power level this relationship is reversed, and now the second
point has a higher empowerment. For example, in Fig. 4.8 we can consider the row of
landscapes for a ∆t of 0.7. With increasing power there appears a new ridge of local
maximal empowerment around the lower rest position of the pendulum.
This slightly counterintuitive effect is a result of how the capacity is distributed on
the separate parallel channels. Be reminded, each channel i contributes its own amount
to the overall capacity
C = max
Pi
∑
i
1
2
log(1 + σiPi) (4.42)
subject to the total power constraint P . Depending on the different values for σi, power
is first allocated to the channel with the highest amplification value σi, up to a point
were the return in capacity for the invested power diminishes so much that adding
power to a different channel yields more capacity. From that point on the overall system
acts as if it was one channel of bigger capacity.
In other words, for low power the factor that determines the channel capacity is
the value of the largest σ alone. Once the power increases, the values of both the σ
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become important. It is therefore possible that for low power, a point with one large
σ has comparatively high empowerment, while for a higher power level, another point
has a higher empowerment, because the combination of all the σ is better. This is what
actually happens in the pendulum example and causes the pendulum to remain in the
lower rest position in the examples with higher power.
This indicates that the the empowerment-induced dynamics is sensitive to the given
power constraint. One interpretation is that agents with weak actuators need to fine-
tune their dynamics to achieve high-empowered states. However, agents with strong
actuators can afford to stay in the potential minimum of the system, as their engine
is strong enough to reach all relevant points without complicated strategems (“if in
doubt, use a bigger hammer”). The inversion phenomenon is a special case for a more
generic principle that force may be used to change the landscape in which the agent
finds itself.
Another observation emerging from the inversion phenomenon is the general ques-
tion of whether the Gaussian choice for the input distribution is appropriate. We know
that some form of constraint must be applied, otherwise one could just chose input dis-
tributions that are spaced so far apart that they would fully compensate for the noise,
giving rise to an (unrealistic) infinite channel capacity. Not only is this unhelpful, but
also, as realistic actuations will be usually limited. In the current model, inspired by
well-established channel capacity applications in communication theory, the power
constraints reflects how limited amount of energies are allotted to broadcast a signal.
But if we instead look, for example, at the acceleration which a robot could apply to its
arm, then for instance an interval constraint would be much more natural to apply. For
instance, an action a the robot could chose would lie, for example, between -4.0 and
+10.0 m/s2; a servo-based system may, instead specify a particular location instead,
but still constrained by a hard-bounded interval. As consequence, it might be better
to have a model where, instead of a general power constraint P , a hard upper and
lower limit for each dimension of the actuator input A is imposed. At present, we are
not aware of a method to directly compute the channel capacity for a multiple input,
multiple output channel with coloured Gaussian noise that uses such a constraint.
4.7.5 Model Acquisition
Before we end this overview we will at least briefly address the problem of model
acquisition or model learning. As mentioned, empowerment needs the model p(s|a, r)
for its computation. Strictly spoken, the acquisition or adaptation of this model is not
part of the empowerment formalism. It is external to it, the model being either given
in advance, or being acquired by one of many candidate techniques. However, given
that empowerment will be used in scenarios where the model is not known and has
to be learnt at the same time as the empowerment gradient is to be followed, model
acquisition needs to be treated alongside the empowerment formalism itself.
As mentioned, empowerment only needs a local model of the dynamics from the
agent’s actuators to the agent’s sensor in the current state of the world, but this local
model is essential to compute empowerment.
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Fig. 4.8. A visualization of the different empowerment landscapes resulting from computation
with different parameters for time step length ∆t and power constraint P . The graphs plot
empowerment for the two dimensional state space (angular speed, angular position) of the pen-
dulum. White areas indicate the highest empowerment, black areas the lowest possible empow-
erment. The lower rest position is in the middle of the plots, and has low empowerment for less
powered scenarios. The upper rest position is high empowered in all cases, it is located in the
middle of the right or left edge of the plots. The areas of high empowerment close to the upright
angel are those were the angular speed moves the pendulum towards the upper rest position.
Figure is taken from (Salge et al. 2012)
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Much of the earlier empowerment work operates under the assumption that the
agent in question has somehow obtained or is given a sufficiently accurate model
p(s|a, r). Without addressing the “how”, this acknowledges the fact that an agent-
centric, intrinsic motivation mechanism needs to have this forward model available
within the agent.
The earliest work to touch on this (Klyubin et al. 2008) deals with context-
dependent empowerment. To model the relationship between an AIBO’s discrete ac-
tions, and some discrete camera inputs, regular motions of the head are performed to
sample the environment. These were then used to construct joint probability distribu-
tions and select an appropriate separation of all states of R into different contexts. The
choice of context itself was also a decision on how to internally represent the world
in an internal model, especially if there is only limited “resources” available to model
the world. By grouping together states that behave similarly, the agent gets a good ap-
proximation of the world dynamics, and its internal empowerment computation results
in high-empowered states. If the agent groups states with different behaviour together,
then the resulting contexts have higher levels of uncertainty, and result in compara-
tively lower empowerment values (from the agent’s perspective).
In general, it is clear that the quality of the model will affect the internal evalu-
ation of empowerment. If the dynamics of a state are modelled with a great degree
of uncertainty, then this noise will also reflect negatively in the empowerment value
for this state. The interesting question here is then how to distinguish between those
states that are truly random, and those where the action model is just currently not well
known. This also indicates another field of future research. The hypothesis is that, if
we would model how exploration or learning would affect our internal model, then the
maximisation of (internally computed) empowerment could also lead to exploration
and learning behaviour.
In the continuous case, we have to deal with the additional question on how to best
represent the conditional probability distributions, since, unlike the discrete case, there
is no general and exact way of doing so. Jung et al. (2011) uses Gaussian Processes to
store the dynamics of the world. This also offers a good interface between the use of
a Gaussian Process Learner and the Monte Carlo integration with assumed Gaussian
noise. The faster quasi-linear Gaussian approximation (Salge et al. 2012) also interact
well with representation, and, conveniently, the covariance metric used for the coloured
noise can be directly derived from the GP. In general, one would assume that other
methods and algorithms to acquire a world model could be similarly combined with
empowerment. It remains an open question which of these models are well suited, not
just as approximations of the world dynamics in general, but in regard to how well
they represent those aspects of the world dynamics that are relevant to attain high
empowerment values.
4.8 Conclusion
The different scenarios presented here, and in the literature on empowerment in gen-
eral, are highlighting an important aspect of the empowerment flavour of intrinsic mo-
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tivation algorithms, namely its universality. The same principle that organizes a swarm
of agents into a pattern can also swing the pendulum into an upright position, seek out
a central location in a maze, be driven towards a manipulable object, or drive the evo-
lution of sensors.
The task-independent nature reflected in this list can be both a blessing and a curse.
In many cases the resulting solution, such as swinging the pendulum into the upright
position, is the goal implied by default by a human observer. However, if indeed a
goal is desired that differs from this default, then empowerment will not be the best
solution. At present, the question of how to integrate explicit non-default goals into
empowerment is fully open.
Another strong assumption that comes with the use of empowerment is its local
character. On the upside, it simplifies the computation and makes the associated model
acquisition much cheaper as only a very small part of the state space ever needs to be
explored; the assumption of the usefulness of empowerment as a proxy principle for
other implicit and less accessible optimization principles depends heavily on how well
the local structure of the system dynamics will reflect its global structure. The precise
nature of this phenomenon is not fully understood in the successful scenarios, but is
believed to have to do with the regularity (e.g. continuity/smoothness) of the system
dynamics. Of course, if any qualitative changes in the dynamics happen just outside
of the empowerment horizon, the locality of empowerment will prevent them from
being seen. This could be due to some disastrous “cliff”, or something harmless like
the discovery of an object that can be manipulated. Once, however, the change enters
the empowerment horizon, and assuming that one can obtain a model of how it will
affect the dynamics without losing the agent, empowerment will provide the gradients
appropriate to the change.
Another central problem that, in the past, has reappeared across different appli-
cations is the computational feasibility. Empowerment quickly becomes infeasible to
compute, which is a problem for both the behavioural empowerment hypothesis, and
the application of empowerment to real-time AI or robotics problems. Newer methods
address both the case for continuous empowerment (such as the QLG), and deeper em-
powerment horizons (such as the “impoverished” versions of empowerment). They, of
course, come with additional assumptions and parameters, and provide only approx-
imate solutions, but maintain the general character of the full solutions, allowing to
export empowerment-like characteristics into domains that were hitherto inaccessible.
Let us conclude with a remark regarding the biological empowerment hypothe-
ses in general: the fact that the default behaviours produced by empowerment seem
often to match what intuitive expectations concerning default behaviour seem to im-
ply, there is some relevance in investigating whether some of these behaviours are
indeed approximating default behaviours observed in nature. A number of arguments
in favour of why empowerment maximizing or similar behaviour could be relevant in
biology have been made in (Klyubin et al. 2008), of which in this review we mainly
highlighted its role as a measure of sensorimotor efficiency and the advantages that an
evolutionary process would confer to more informationally efficient perception-action
configurations.
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Together with other intrinsic motivation measures, empowerment is thus a candi-
date measure which may help bridge the gap between understanding how organisms
may be able to carry out default adaptations into their niche in an effective manner,
and methods which would also allow artificial devices to try and copy the success that
biological organisms have in doing so.
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